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Islam in Russia Under the Federal Law on Freedom
of Conscience and on Religious Associations: Official
Tolerance in an Intolerant Society
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the 7000 Muslims in Taganrog, a city in southern Russia, “have had nowhere to meet.”1 When
the “community applied for permission to build a mosque, the city
administration offered a plot of land.”2 After construction began,
however, the non-Muslim community began expressing fears and
concerns, sometimes violently.3 As local elections approached,
“[T]he Cossacks issued an open letter saying they would only support a candidate opposing construction of the mosque.”4 Finally, the
regional administration called a meeting to resolve the problem. Despite agreeing that religious groups have the right to build places of
worship, the administration, “bowing to public unease, . . . agreed
the mosque should be built without a minaret so that it would not
be obvious as a mosque.”5 While Russia guarantees its citizens religious freedom, the unfortunate reality, as seen in this example, is
that religious freedom is often sacrificed to the whims and prejudices
of various authorities, especially when pressured by political majorities.
In 1997, the Russian Federation passed a new law on freedom of
conscience.6 Many people in the West have concentrated on how this
law affects religious freedom in Russia and the ability of non1. Tatyana Titova, Russia: Precarious Future for Half-finished Taganrog Mosque,
KESTON NEWS SERV. (Dec. 8, 2000) (visited Feb 8, 2001) <http://www.keston.org/
001208RU.htm>.
2. Id.
3. See id. One evening, “some people came to the building site, seized the guard and
beat him up, threatening to kill him if construction continued.” Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Known as the 1997 Law on the Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations, the law determines how religions are recognized by the Russian government and what
rights they can enjoy. See Keston Institute, Russian Federation Federal Law: “On Freedom of
Conscience and on Religious Associations” (Lawrence A. Uzzell trans., visited Sept. 22, 1999)
<http://serv5.law.emory.edu/EILR/special/97law.html>.
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traditional Christian religious groups to proselyte and operate in
Russia.7 Few people have focused on how this law affects nonChristian religious practices such as Islam. Though Muslims have
historically played important roles in the development of Russian history, culture, and politics, they have experienced state-sponsored discrimination and repression. Currently, the government officially supports the existence of Islam in the country; however, treatment of
Muslims by government officials indicates that intolerant attitudes
still exist. The main obstacle for Islam under the new law is not the
law itself, but how the law is applied in connection with historical
and contemporary perceptions and prejudices about Muslims.
To provide a background for understanding current perceptions
of Islam in Russia, Part II briefly explains the history of Islam in Russia. Next, Part III examines the contemporary laws of the Russian
Federation enacted to protect and regulate freedom of conscience
and religion. Part IV provides a brief description of the organization
of Islam in Russia and discusses the treatment of Muslims in different
areas of the country. Part V suggests three main areas of concern that
Russia should address in order to assuage the Islamic community’s
concerns and avoid what the government fears most—a rebellion of
the Islamic population, the likes of which have not been seen since
Pugachev.8 This paper concludes in Part VI that while the Muslim
population is stable and loyal to the Russian government, the situation could change quickly, especially if the government continues to
allow police persecution of ethnic Muslims and the repression of all
Muslims in order to control extremism and terrorism.
II. HISTORY OF ISLAM IN RUSSIA
From its modest beginnings over a thousand years ago, Islam has
become a very large movement in Russia. Official state treatment of
Islam varied over the course of time according to who was in power.

7. See W. Cole Durham, Jr. & Lauren B. Homer, Russia’s 1997 Law on Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Associations: An Analytical Appraisal, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 101,
230 (1998).
8. Pugachev led a fearfully successful rebellion against Russian authority in the eighteenth century. According to an Islamic scholar, “[i]t was the Pugachev war of 1773–1775 in
which Muslims from the Volga and Ural areas took an active part that forced the authorities to
[pay attention to Muslim concerns].” Marat Murtazin, Muslims and Russia: War or Peace?,
CENT. ASIA & THE CAUCUSES J. SOC. & POL. STUD. ∗6 (visited Feb. 5, 2001)
<http://www.ca-c.org/journal/eng01_2000/17.murtazin.shtml>.
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Under the tsars, Muslims received some official recognition. The Soviets, after initially ignoring the Muslims, sought to eliminate Islam
along with all other religions. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Islam has experienced a rebirth. This rebirth shows that, as a religious
minority, Muslims will have an important voice in Russia’s future.
A. Russia and Islam Under the Tsars
Only twenty years after it was founded in what is now Saudi Arabia, Islam came to Dagestan as the result of conquest by Arab Muslims.9 Conversion of the people along the Volga River (Tatarstan)
occurred in the ninth century. In A.D. 922, the Volga Bulgars, the
ancestors of the Tatars, adopted Islam.10 Islam did not have a strong
presence in Russia until the Golden Horde brought contact between
the Orthodox Russians and the Mongols.11 When the Mongols invaded Russia, they did not belong to the Muslim faith.12 However,
within a century of their invasion, the Mongols converted to Islam
and spread the faith throughout the conquered territory.13 Some
scholars claim that the reign of Muslim Mongols over Orthodox
Russia created some deep-rooted antagonistic feelings in Russia toward Muslims.14
In the sixteenth century, Russia began to throw off the Mongol
yoke and invaded and conquered traditionally Muslim areas.15 As the
tsars took control of Volga regions and the Khanate of Kazan, where
many Muslim groups lived, government policy towards the Muslim
population was mostly tolerant.16 To win the loyalty of the local aristocracy, the tsarist administration showed goodwill and support for

9. See Donna E. Arzt, Historical Heritage or Ethno-National Threat? Proselytizing and
the Muslim Umma of Russia, 12 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 413, 426 (1998). The area of southern
Dagestan is only 500 miles away from the center of the Islamic world—Mecca and Medina.
10. See F.A. ASADULLIN, MUSUL’MANSKIE DUKHOVNYE ORGANIZATSII I OB’EDINENIYA ROCCIISKOI FEDERATSII [Muslim Spiritual Organizations and Associations of the Russian Federation] 11 (1999).
11. “The Golden Horde constituted one component of the much larger Mongol Empire.” JANET MARTIN, From Kiev to Muscovy: The Beginnings to 1450, in RUSSIA: A HISTORY
15 (Gregory L. Freeze ed., 1997).
12. See Shirin Akiner, Islam, the State and Ethnicity in Central Asia in Historical Perspective, 24 RELIGION, ST. & SOC’Y 90, 93 (1996).
13. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 426.
14. See id. at 427.
15. See id.
16. See id. at 428.
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Islam.17 It even allocated money to construct mosques and print
Muslim literature.18
While Russia strengthened its ties with Muslims along the Volga,
its contacts with Muslims in the North Caucasus were much more
strained. Russia began to gain territory in the Caucasus in the eighteenth century19 but had been pushing toward that area since the time
of Boris Godunov.20 The Russians found these Muslim people difficult to conquer. In the lower Caucus regions, Russia was unable to
assert control over the local inhabitants until 1856, “when the last
Sufi leader, Imam Shamil, was forced to surrender after a thirty-year
armed struggle against colonial domination.”21 Once the people had
been conquered, the tsars had to decide how to deal with them.
During the time of Peter the Great, authorities in Moscow began
to fear the existence of so many Muslims only two hundred miles
away from the capital.22 In order to alleviate this fear, the Tsar encouraged the conversion of the Muslims to Orthodoxy.23 This forced
conversion was met with extreme resistance and soured the relations
between the Tatar Muslims and Russians.24 Few people really converted, and those that did returned to Islam as soon as the government relaxed its policies.25
In the eighteenth century, Catherine the Great took a different
approach to dealing with the Muslim people of southern Russia. She
created a Muslim Spiritual Assembly centered in Orenburg, which
“held jurisdiction over religious training and publication in both the
European and Siberian portions of the empire.”26 This Assembly
eventually moved to Ufa, becoming “the official central institution

17. See Akiner, supra note 12, at 99.
18. See id.
19. See Thomas D. Grant, A Panel of Experts for Chechnya: Purposes and Prospects in
Light of International Law, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 115, 124 (1999).
20. Arzt, supra note 9, at 428. Boris Godunov led Russia for a time at the beginning of
the seventeenth century. See HANS-JOACHIM TORKE, From Muscovy Towards St. Petersburg, in
RUSSIA: A HISTORY, supra note 11, at 56–59.
21. Arzt, supra note 9, at 428. History shows that the people in this area, which includes Chechnya, held closer ties to the Middle East than they did to Moscow until this fighting stopped in the middle of the nineteenth century.
22. See id. at 429.
23. See id.
24. See id.
25. See id. at 430.
26. Id.
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of the Muslim clergy for the whole of Russia.”27 The creation of this
special governmental religious institution helped the spread of Islam
within Russia.28 These changes brought economic prosperity to the
region and allowed the “mass construction of mosques and the promotion of Islam with the support of the Russian state.”29 Her tolerant policies also allowed Muslims in the areas of Tatarstan and Bashkortostan to create strong ties with Moscow. Because of tsarist policy
near the Revolution, “the Tatars became integrated into the empire,
while the Caucasians remained aloof,”30 showing the disparate treatment of the Muslim community in these different areas. These tolerant policies lasted until the Communists took over.
B. Russia and Islam Under Communism
At first the Communists interfered very little with Islam.31 In
fact, some claim that “Islam at first suffered less under the Soviets
than did Orthodoxy or Judaism.”32 Not long after the revolution,
Lenin even sent out a decree announcing that Muslims were free to
worship as they would.33 After a few years, however, the Soviets began repressing the Muslim faithful. In the 1930s, the Soviets forced
madrasahs34 and mosques to close35 and suppressed the clergy.36 On
27. Sergei Filatov, Tatarstan: at the Crossroads of Islam and Orthodoxy, 26 RELIGION,
ST. & SOC’Y 265, 266 (1998) [hereinafter Filatov, Tatarstan]. See also Sergei Filatov, Religion,
Power and Nationhood in Sovereign Bashkortostan, 25 RELIGION, ST. & SOC’Y 267, 269
(1997) [hereinafter Filatov, Bashkortostan].
28. See ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 12.
29. Filatov, Bashkortostan, supra note 27, at 269. See also Arzt, supra note 9, at 430.
30. Arzt, supra note 9, at 430–31.
31. It is interesting to note that during the revolution, the different Muslim areas of
Russia reacted separately to the new Soviet government. In the Northern Caucuses, it took the
Bolsheviks from the time of the revolution in 1917 until 1936 to put down a revolt in Dagestan and Chechnya; Tatarstan, on the other hand, became an autonomous republic in 1920. See
Arzt, supra note 9, at 432. When a new revolt broke out in Chechnya in 1944, over a half million people, nearly all the Chechen and Ingush population, were forcibly exiled to areas of Siberia and Kazakhstan. See id. at 434. Under Khrushchev, the Chechen people were finally allowed to return to their homes in 1957. See id. at 435. One can see why there is little love lost
between the Russians and the Chechens.
32. Id. at 431.
33. See id.
34. Islamic schools.
35. See Murtazin, supra note 8, at ∗7.
36. See Michael Bourdeaux, The New Russian Law on Religion: A View from the Regions,
49 DEPAUL L. REV. 139, 156 (1999). See also Filatov, Bashkortostan, supra note 27, at 271;
Filatov, Tatarstan, supra note 27, at 267.
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Stalin’s orders, Muslim leaders by the thousands ended up in the gulag and a million Muslims were exiled to Siberia and Kazakhstan.37
From then on, the Soviets kept strict control over official Islamic
actions by centering Islamic leadership in the government controlled
Muslim Spiritual Administration of the European Part of the USSR
and Siberia.38 In all, the Soviets closed or destroyed 30,000 mosques,
and closed 14,000 Islamic religious schools.39 Despite the persecution, the Islamic tradition remained strong and quickly revived when
the opportunity to express religion freely returned to Russia after the
fall of the Soviet Union.
C. Islam in Russia in the Post-Soviet Era
Even before the fall of Communism and the Soviet Union, Islam
experienced an incredible revival. At the present time, Muslims make
up fifteen to eighteen percent of the Russian population—20 million
people.40 In comparison with other Islamic nations, this high number of Muslims places Russia among Saudi Arabia and Iraq as one of
the most populous Muslim nations.41 Currently, there are more than
7000 operating mosques in Russia, comparable to the number in
Egypt.42 While this may be true, it is impossible not to note that
“until the early 1990s Checheno-Ingushetia [a Russian province in
the Northern Caucuses] was the only Muslim republic where not a
single mosque was registered, while churches existed for the minority
Christian population.”43

37. See JIM FOREST, RELIGION IN THE NEW RUSSIA: THE IMPACT OF PERESTROIKA ON
(1990).
38. See ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 13.
39. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 436. The Chairman of the Central Spiritual Administration
of Muslims in Ufa noted in 1930 that “[a]ll religious organizations of the Muslims are on the
point of complete destruction and disappearance. Eighty-seven percent of regional Muslim
centers were closed down; over 10,000 mosques out of 12,000 were also closed; from 90 to
97 percent of the mullahs and muezzins cannot serve.” Murtazin, supra note 8, at ∗7 (quoting
a report by Rizaetdin Fakhretdinov).
40. See ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 14.
41. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 440.
42. See ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 14. Compare this with fact that in 1917 there
were 14,300 mosques; by 1948, only 416 registered mosques; and in 1968 only 311. See id. at
14–15. Appendix, Table 1 illustrates where many of these mosques are located.
43. Arzt, supra note 9, at 444.
THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS LIFE IN THE SOVIET UNION 156
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Of the over 100 identifiable ethnic groups in Russia, more than
twenty are considered Muslim. The Tatars, Bashkirs, and Kazakhs
(all Turkic) and the Chechens, Avars, and Kabardianians (all Caucasian) are the largest of these traditionally Muslim ethnic groups.44
Despite this vast ethnic difference, Russian Muslims do not have any
contentious divisions between each other.45 Reports indicate that
conflicts between Christianity and Islam exist in Eastern Europe, including parts of Russia; however, economic factors rather than religious factors are their root cause.46
Under the Soviets, there were two directorates that controlled
the spiritual activities of the Muslims: the Spiritual Directorate of
Muslims for the European part of the USSR and Siberia centered in
Ufa and the Spiritual Directorate of Muslims for the Northern Caucuses centered in Makhachkala.47 Since the fall of Communism, the
number of individual Spiritual Directorates has increased to over
forty.48 In March 1996, many of these Spiritual Directorates met together in Moscow to discuss mutual understanding and a unified
front concerning key problems facing the Muslim community in the
country. As a result of this meeting, the Council of Russian Muftis
was created August 21, 1996.49 The Council of Russian Muftis, led
by sheik Ravil Gainutdin, has four main goals:
[C]onsolidation of Muslim religious organizations of the
Russian Federation with the goal to compatibly decide the most
important problems concerning all Russian Muslims together;
[C]oordination and mutual aid in the operation of each other’s
organization;
[W]ork out positions in relations with the organs of the central
and local government, the organizations representing different
confessions, and international foreign organizations;

44. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 442. See also Appendix, Table 3.
45. See Moshe Gammer, Unity, Diversity and Conflict in the Northern Caucasus, in
MUSLIM EURASIA: CONFLICTING LEGACIES 163 (Yaacov Ro’i ed., 1995).
46. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 444.
47. See ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 18.
48. See id.
49. See id. at 19.
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[T]he creation of necessary conditions for the observance of the
rights and the protection of the interests of Russian Muslims.50

The President of the Council of Russian Muftis is sheik Ravil
Gainutdin. The Council of Russian Muftis consists of sixteen Muslim
religious organizations known as Muslim Spiritual Directorates
(DUM).51 The Muslim Spiritual Directorates that make up the
Council of Russian Muftis are themselves a collection of various religious associations and groups that represent Muslims throughout the
Russian Federation. In reality, the Council of Russian Muftis must
try to serve the interests of thousands of local Muslim congregations.
The largest member of the Council of Russian Muftis is the Muslim Spiritual Directorate for the European Part of Russia
(DUMER).52 Ravil Gainutdin, the current President of the Council
of Russian Muftis, is also the president of the DUMER.53 The structure of the DUMER includes a secretariat of muftis and various departments responsible for ensuring the coordination of various aspects of Muslim life.54 More than 150 Muslim mosques and
organizations fall under the care of the DUMER.55 One of the more
important tasks that the DUMER focuses on is the building of new
mosques and the repair and restoration of mosques constructed before the revolution.56 Recently, the DUMER also arranged for the
50. Id. at 20–21.
51. These religious organizations include the Muslim Spiritual Directorate (DUM)
European Part of Russia, DUM Asian Part of Russia, DUM Adygeya, DUM Bashkortostan,
DUM Dagestan, DUM Kabardin-Balkaria, DUM Nizhni Novgorod, DUM Orenburg, DUM
Penza, DUM Povolzhia (Saratov), DUM Tatarstan, DUM Ulyanovsk, DUM Chuvashia,
DUM North Ossetia, DUM Ingushetia, and DUM Karachay-Cherkess. See id. at 21–23. Each
DUM represents several registered Muslim groups located in the Russian province for which it
is named. For example, DUM Dagestan represents 1557 registered Muslim groups from
Dagestan. See id. at 30.
52. The second largest member is the Muslim Spiritual Directorate for the Asian Part of
Russia. This organization includes sixteen associations with at least twenty-six congregations
throughout eastern provinces of Russia. See id. at 81–86.
53. See id. at 39. Appendix, Table 2 lists the organizations that have become members
of DUMER.
54. These departments are divided into the following areas of responsibility: science and
communication with the authorities of the Russian Federation, coordination of religious organizations, Islamic instruction, administration, charity, publications, public relations, ritual
services, security council, organization of pilgrimages, and the production of food according to
Muslim dietary laws. See id. at 42–43.
55. See id. at 43.
56. See id. at 45.
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transmission of Muslim programs on major radio and television stations.57 While religious freedom has only truly existed in Russia for a
short while, the Muslims have been able to develop important structures and organizations to strengthen and support the Muslim faithful.
III. A SURVEY OF LAW ON RELIGION IN RUSSIA
Under the Communists, the Soviet government tightly regulated
and closely supervised religion and belief. Beginning even before
Gorbachev’s introduction of glasnost, a rebirth of religious interest
began to develop among the citizenry. With the fall of the Soviet
Union, the excitement of newfound freedom led to the passage of
very liberal laws guaranteeing the freedom of conscience, or the ability to believe as one wants. Since the euphoria of freedom has worn
off, however, the government has retreated from its original liberal
stand. In 1997, Russia passed a law concerning the freedom of conscience that exemplifies the feelings that now permeate the Russian
Federation that religion should be more closely regulated by the
government. This section first examines the 1990 law concerning
freedom of conscience. Then it will explore the sections on religious
freedom contained in the 1993 Constitution. Finally, it will discuss
the 1997 law and its effects on religion in Russia.
A. The 1990 Soviet Law and Religious Freedom
Shortly before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev’s
reforms had paved the way for the passage of a very liberal law on religious freedom. In 1990, Russia passed the Law on Freedom of
Conscience and Religious Organizations,58 “guarantee[ing] full
equality of all religious groups.”59 This law closely followed the language of such international legal documents as the Convention for
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and the

57. See id. at 47.
58. See ALEKSANDR SHCHIPKOV, VO CHTO VERIT ROCCIIA [What Does Russia Believe]
264 (1998).
59. Irina G. Basova, Comment, Freedom Under Fire: The New Russian Religious Law,
14 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 181, 186–87 (2000). See also Arina Lekhel, Note, Leveling the
Playing Field for Religious “Liberty” in Russia: A Critical Analysis of the 1997 Law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations”, 32 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 167, 189–90
(1999).
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.60 At the time,
this action constituted a radical change from the government’s previous official position of state-mandated atheism and strict control
over religious life.61
B. The 1993 Constitution of the Russian Federation and Religious
Freedom
In December 1993, the citizens in the Russian Federation voted
for a new constitution. Not without its problems, this constitution
became “the first to be adopted by [an] all-people’s vote” and not in
conformity with the old communist tradition.62 The Constitution
became the supreme law of the land and still applies to the Russian
government’s actions today.
The Constitution specifically speaks to the issue of religion and
conscience. Article 13 of the Constitution forbids the formation of
any group that incites religious enmity.63 Article 14 establishes the
Russian Federation as a secular state and states that “[n]o religion
may be established as State or obligatory.”64 In addition, Article 14
holds that “[r]eligious associations shall be separate from the State
and equal before the law.”65 These articles establish the principle of
separation of church and state as a foundation of the Russian Federation. To emphasize the importance of this language, Article 15 proclaims that the Constitution will “have the highest legal force” in the
land and that all other laws or legal actions “must not be contrary to
the Constitution of the Russian Federation.”66

60. See Lekhel, supra note 59, at 190. Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights established an international norm protecting religious freedoms. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, art. 18,
999 U.N.T.S. 171.
61. See Basova, supra note 59, at 187.
62. RUSSIAN LEGAL TEXTS: THE FOUNDATIONS OF A RULE-OF-LAW STATE AND A
MARKET ECONOMY 2 (William E. Butler & Jane E. Henderson eds. & William E. Butler
trans., 1998).
63. See KONST. RF art. 13, ¶ 5 (1993) in RUSSIAN LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 62 at 7
(“The creation and activity of social associations whose purposes or actions are directed towards the forcible change of the foundations of the constitutional system and a violation of the
integrity of the Russian Federation, subverting the security of the State, the creation of armed
formations, incitement of social, racial, nationality, and religious enmity shall be prohibited.”).
64. Id. art. 14, ¶ 1.
65. Id. art. 14, ¶ 2.
66. Id. art. 15, ¶ 1.
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The second chapter of the Constitution sets out the rights that
individual citizens will enjoy under the protection of the Constitution and guarantees equal application of rights and freedoms.67 Even
though the Constitution allows for the freedom of thought and
speech, this freedom is limited if it incites people to religious enmity
and hatred.68 Most importantly, the Constitution protects the freedom of conscience and religious belief.69 One cannot read the 1993
Constitution of the Russian Federation and not feel that the document was truly intended to protect people’s rights to believe as their
conscience dictated. However, politicians apparently became uncomfortable with the non-regulation of religion, and, four years later,
they enacted a law controlling and regulating religion.
C. The 1997 Federal Law on the Freedom of Conscience and on
Religious Associations
Even as early as 1993, some moves were made attempting to restrict the activities of certain religious groups. A proposed law to
prohibit the proselytizing and activity of non-traditional religions
was introduced into the Russian Supreme Soviet in July 1993.70 This
law even received the support of an important Muslim leader, Mufti
Talgat Tadzhuddin.71 President Yeltsin vetoed the proposal because
it violated the Russian Federation’s international treaty obligations
and the 1978 Russian Constitution (the 1993 Constitution had not
been adopted yet).72
By 1997, the same proposal surfaced again, this time with more
67. See id. art. 19, ¶ 2 (“The State shall guarantee the equality of rights and freedoms of
man and citizen irrespective of sex, race, nationality, language, origin, property and official position, place of residence, attitude towards religion, convictions, affiliation to social associations, and also other circumstances. Any forms of the limitation of the rights of citizens according to indicia of social, racial, nationality, language, or religious affiliation shall be
prohibited.”).
68. See id. art. 29, ¶ 2 (“Propaganda or agitation inciting social, racial, nationality, or
religious enmity and hatred shall not be permitted. Propaganda of social, racial, nationality,
religious, or linguistic supremacy shall be prohibited.”).
69. The Constitution states that “[e]ach shall be guaranteed the freedom of conscience,
freedom of religious belief, including the right to propagate any religion individually or jointly
with others, or not to propagate, freely choose, have, and disseminate religious and other convictions and to act in accordance with them.” Id. art. 28.
70. See RUSSIAN LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 62, at 116.
71. See JOHN ANDERSON, RELIGION, STATE AND POLITICS IN THE SOVIET UNION AND
SUCCESSOR STATES 197 (1994).
72. See RUSSIAN LEGAL TEXTS, supra note 62, at 116.
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support. An initial version of the law quickly passed through the
State Duma and the Supreme Soviet in late June and early July of
1997. In September, a revised version of the law was submitted,
passed by the State Duma and the Supreme Soviet, and signed by
President Yeltsin into law on September 26, 1997.73 This revised version of the law recognized certain religions as traditionally Russian,
but gave special recognition to Orthodoxy. The preamble proclaimed “the special contribution of Orthodoxy to the history of
Russia and to the establishment and development of Russia’s spirituality and culture; respecting Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Judaism
and other religions and creeds which constitute an inseparable part
of the historical heritage of Russia’s peoples. . . .”74 While the Soviet
Union had also officially recognized all of these traditional faiths, but
only allowed them to operate under tight regulation, this new law
gave the traditional religions full legal status.75 Interestingly, an earlier version of the law would have placed Islam on a nearly equal
footing with Orthodoxy.76 The actual text of that proposed preamble
noted that “‘[o]rthodoxy as an inseparable part of the All-Russian
historical, spiritual and cultural heritage, and equally Islam with its
millions of members, and also Buddhism, Judaism and other religions
traditionally existing in the Russian Federation.’”77 This version
failed to pass, however.
The 1997 law regulates all religious associations, but treats these
associations differently depending on their type. A “religious organization” enjoys certain legal privileges that are not extended to “religious groups,” but an “organization” must have “existed on the
given territory for no less than fifteen years” or be part of a centralized religious organization.78 A “religious group” has limited privileges and protections.79 The law includes many prohibitions against
73. See id. at 117.
74. Keston Institute, supra note 6.
75. See ICRF world report/CIS(former Soviet Union)/Russia (visited Sept. 29, 1999)
<http:\\www.religiousfreedom.com>.
76. See Lawrence A. Uzzell, Amendment to Elevate Islam, KESTON NEWS SERV., June
20, 1997. This action would have put Islam by implication “ahead of Buddhism and Judaism.”
Id.
77. Arzt, supra note 9, at 423 (quoting Lawrence Uzell, Additional Amendments to
Law on Religion for “Third Reading”, KESTON NEWS SERV., June 22, 1997 (emphasis omitted).
78. Keston Institute, supra note 6, art. 9.1.
79. See id. art. 7.

784

16PRE-FIN.DOC

7/4/01 11:13 AM

773]

Islam in Russia

government intervention and specific protections that allow for the
free exercise of conscience and religion.80
According to official publications from the Council of Russian
Muftis and the Muslim Spiritual Directorate for the European part of
Russia, the 1997 law is a success. The Council of Russian Muftis cite
their “participation in the preparation and acceptance of the Federal
Law ‘On Freedom of Conscience and on Religious Associations.’”81
as an important reflection of their influence with the government.
When preparing the law, the opinions of all the muftis in the Council
were considered.82 The Council of Russian Muftis supports the 1997
law whole-heartedly.
Even though Islam is afforded special recognition as a traditional
religion under the 1997 law, the true impact of the law is not its language, but the method and manner by which it is implemented.83
Russia has had a long history of state control over religious organizations for political purposes.84 Even now, though freedom of conscience exists and the state professes to not interfere with religious
observances, political control of religion plays a prominent role in
government.85 In addition, the resurgence of nationalism and the
fear of terrorism have caused latent discriminatory practices to increase.
IV. CURRENT STATUS OF ISLAM IN RUSSIA
Like all other religions, Islamic organizations must register under
the 1997 law to receive the benefits afforded religious organizations.
For the most part, Islamic religious organizations have not experienced difficulties registering under the new law. However, certain
problem areas have become apparent, Chechnya being one of the
most extreme. In addition, Muslims find that ancient prejudices
combined with current crises continue to impede the freedom of

80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See id. art. 3.
ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 23.
See id. at 24.
See Durham & Homer, supra note 7, at 230.
See supra Part II.
See infra Part IV.C.1.a.
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conscience and belief in Russia.86 An annual report by the U.S. State
Department states that “[d]iscriminatory practices at the local level
also are attributable to the increased decentralization of power over
the past several years and the relatively greater susceptibility of local
governments to lobbying by majority religions, as well as to government inaction and discriminatory attitudes that are widely held in society.”87 This section first discusses the history and existence of
Wahhabism in Russia today. Next, it looks at the Muslim communities’ ability to register under the 1997 law. Then it explores the
situation in the two different strongly Muslim areas of Russia: the
Caucasus, specifically Dagestan, Chechnya, and the Volga region including Tatarstan and Bashkortostan.
A. Wahhabism in Russia
Wahhabism has existed for hundreds of years and, in the last few
decades, has become very popular in Russia.88 In the eighteenth century, a religious and political movement developed “out of the ideas
of Muhammad ibn Abd-el Wahhab.”89 The movement sought to purify Islam of alterations that had occurred over time and insisted on
“strictly follow[ing] customs existing during Prophet Muhammad’s
lifetime.”90 At the time, Muhammad ibn Abd-el Wahhab felt that
too many Muslims had strayed from the principal teachings of Islam;
his movement was a response to revive the faith.91
Many of the principles espoused by the Wahhabites are shared by
all Muslims. “It teaches the Muslims to follow the Sunna of the
Prophet and be good, cautious, keep their promises, exercise patience, do not tell lies, spread slander or rumors, help those who
need help, do not be stingy, envious, cowards or to perjure.”92
However, it also “developed an extreme intolerance of the non86. For a prime example, see supra Part I.
87. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
2000 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: RUSSIA (Sept. 5, 2000)
(visited Apr. 27, 2001) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/
irf_russia.html>, at ∗1 [hereinafter 2000 ANNUAL REPORT].
88. “[T]his trend in Islam [Wahhabism] is growing stronger not only in the Caucasus
but also throughout Russia.” “No Wahhabis” in Karachay-Cherkess Republic, IZVESTIAYA, May
6, 2000.
89. 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 87, at ∗8.
90. Id.
91. See id. at ∗9.
92. Id.
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Muslims and those Muslims who followed different Islamic
trends.”93 It is because of their intolerance, which often leads to violence, that Wahhabism has earned the wrath of the Russian government and even of Muslim organizations and communities.94
B. Muslim Registration Under the 1997 Law
The U.S. State Department maintains records regarding the registration of religious groups under Russia’s 1997 law. As of January
1999, “over half of registered [religious] organizations were Russian
Orthodox, 18 percent were Muslim, and 20 percent were Christian
organizations other than Russian Orthodox.”95 Nearly 16,750 organizations had been registered, representing 57 confessions, but an
estimated 15,000 more organizations remained to be registered by
the end of 1999.96 Only a year later, the U.S. State Department reported that only seven hundred more religious organizations had
registered at the national level.97 According to the report, local Muslim organizations are still struggling to register because of conflicts
between the Central Spiritual Directorate of Muslims in European
Russia and Siberia (Central Spiritual Directorate), based in Ufa, and
the Moscow-based Russian Council of Muftis.98 One problem causing this delay was that “local authorities in some cases were obstructing the registration of local organizations that wished to join [the
Russian Council of Muftis] rather than [the Central Spiritual Directorate], and that those who wished to leave [the Central] Spiritual
Directorate were being accused of ‘Wahhabism.’”99

93. Id. at ∗10.
94. See id.
95. BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE,
1999 ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: RUSSIA (Sept. 9, 1999)
(visited Feb. 8, 2001) <http://www.state.gov/www/global/human_rights/irf/irf_rpt/
∗
1999/irf_russia99.html>, at 1 [hereinafter 1999 ANNUAL REPORT].
∗
96. See id. at 4.
97. See 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 87. “According to January 2000 [Russian]
Ministry of Justice statistics, there are now 17,427 religious organizations registered nation∗
wide.” Id. at 6.
98. See id. (as reported by the Keston Institute in May 2000).
∗
99. Id. at 7. Wahhabism is a Muslim sect that has become associated with terrorism.
“In the Russian context, ‘Wahhabism,’ the name of a strict branch of Sunni Islam that originated in Saudi Arabia, has become a pejorative term because of persistent allegations that
∗
‘Wahhabi extremism’ is to blame for terrorist attacks linked to Chechnya.” Id. at 7. See supra
Part V.C.
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Under an extension granted by acting President Vladimir Putin
in March 2000, religious organizations had until December 31,
2000 to register under to the 1997 law.100 Religious groups or
organizations that failed to meet the deadline may be liquidated—
that is, deprived of legal personality—which includes “the right to
publish, import or distribute literature, invite foreign citizens, form
rental agreements or conduct charitable activity.”101 According to the
Keston Institute,102 the first known cases brought in court to liquidate unregistered religious organizations include thirty-seven Muslim
communities.103 Only one non-Muslim organization, a Jehovah’s
Witness congregation, suffered the same fate.104 The cases, brought
by authorities in Kabardino-Balkaria, a republic in the North Caucasus, involved Muslim communities that failed to register because the
process was too complex.105 Many other religious groups will suffer
the same fate, but it appears that Islamic communities will suffer
first.
C. Specific Examples of Intolerance and Discrimination Against
Muslims
A large percentage of Russian Muslims are concentrated in two
distinct parts of the country: the North Caucasus (near the former
Soviet Republics of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) and the
Volga region including Tatarstan and Bashkortostan (bordering on
the former Soviet Republic of Kazakhstan). The Muslims who live in
and near Tatarstan and Bashkortostan have closer social and historical ties to Russia.106 The Southern provinces (in an area called the
100. See Tatyana Titova, Russia: Muslims First for Mandatory Liquidation, KESTON NEWS
SERV. (Jan. 24, 2001) (visited Feb. 2, 2001) <http://www.keston.org/010124RU.htm>.
Before the extension was granted, all religious organizations had to register by December 31,
1999, according to the actual terms of the 1997 law.
101. Id.
102. The Keston Institute is an organization that has been monitoring the status of religious freedom in the former Soviet Union for the last thirty years. See The Work of Keston Institute (visited Apr. 30, 2001) <http://www.keston.org/infoframe.htm>.
103. See Titova, supra note 100.
104. See id.
105. See id.
106. One author commented that in Tatarstan, at least, this is a result of “a particular
mentality inclined to tolerance, compromise and obedience to authority.” Alexei Zverev,
Qualified Sovereignty: The Tatarstan Model for Resolving Conflicting Loyalties, in
CONFLICTING LOYALTIES AND THE STATE IN POST-SOVIET RUSSIA AND EURASIA 118, 142
(Michael Waller et al. eds., 1998).
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North Caucuses) have less association with Russia and are closer in
spirit (and in geography) to the Muslim nations of the Middle
East.107 This section discusses the experience of the Muslim communities in each of these areas.
1. Muslims in Tatarstan and Bashkortostan
a. Tatarstan. Even though Islam is the majority religion in Tatarstan, Muslims still find it difficult to practice their religion freely.
This situation exists more from the political situation in Tatarstan
than from anything else. The elected president of Tatarstan, Mentimer Shaimiyev, has prohibited the return of Muslim, Orthodox, and
Catholic buildings, and has used his power as president to influence
Muslim leadership. While the government interferes in religion, societal attitude toward religion is very open. Muslim and Orthodox
leaders have positive and peaceful relations. Some attribute this good
relationship to “the fact that Tatarstan has been part of Russia for
more than four centuries” and that “[t]he Tatars’ brand of Islam is
more Europeanised.”108 The strong ties to Russia and the good relations between religious leaders have allowed Tatarstan to remain free
of tension between religious groups. However, tension between the
government and religion has been growing.
This tension between the government and religion can be seen in
several examples. When Catholic priests came to Tatarstan to revive
the Roman Catholic parish, they received a warm welcome from the
Orthodox Bishop.109 After their arrival, the Catholics found opposition, not from other religions, but from the government. While trying to register congregations, the authorities “kept changing the
number of signatures required.”110 In addition, the government refused to return the Catholic Church in Kazan that was built in
1858.111 When the Catholics inquired about another church located
107. See Christian Caryl, Is Putin Fomenting a Holy War?, NEW STATESMAN, May 1,
2000, at 21.
108. Lawrence A. Uzzell, Orthodox and Muslims Build Common Front in Tatarstan,
KESTON NEWS SERV., July 8, 1996 [hereinafter Common Front].
109. See Lawrence A. Uzzell, Priests from Argentina Revive Catholic Parish in Kazan,
KESTON NEWS SERV., July 8, 1996.
110. Id.
111. See id. According to the government, the building’s occupant, an aviation institute,
could not spare any room. See id.
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in a cemetery, the authorities indicated that the building would be
returned.112 However, they refused to put this promise in writing and
refused to return the building immediately.
Catholics are not the only religious group to have difficulty obtaining return of pre-Communism church buildings; Muslims have
also struggled to obtain the return of mosques. President Shaimiyev
“has only voluntarily returned ancient churches or mosques to their
historic owners only when such buildings have no commercial or political value.”113 Many of these historic buildings lie in the center of
Kazan, and President Shaimiyev consistently denies the return of
these buildings because they lie in an area highly prized by
businessmen and bureaucrats.114 After waiting for the return of a
madrasah, or divinity school, Muslims turned to civil disobedience,
and for five days they occupied the building.
Showing mutual support, Bishop Anastasi of the Orthodox
Church visited the Muslim protesters.115 Similarly, when the Orthodox hold cross-bearing processions to the Kazan’s city hall or to federal buildings, they often find Muslims joining in their protest.116
Muslim leaders have made statements supporting these Orthodox attempts to obtain return of their churches. The government claims it
is only trying to represent the Muslim interests by not returning Orthodox buildings, but that does not explain why the government refuses to return Muslim buildings. The head mufti of the Muslim
Spiritual Directorate in Tatarstan denied that the government acted
on behalf of Muslims and supported the return of the churches to
the Orthodox.117 Reportedly, even Muslim businessmen have contributed financially to aid the Orthodox in restoring churches.118 The
numbers of Muslims and Orthodox are about equal in Tatarstan, and
religious leaders recognize the need “to live in peace and to avoid
being divided from each other.”119 The cause of these problems is
the political aspirations of the province’s president rather than any
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
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religious antagonism between Muslims and Christians.
b. Bashkortostan. Similar to the inhabitants of the neighboring
province Tatarstan, a majority of people in Bashkortostan consider
themselves Muslim.120 Like most of Russia, the believers of different
faiths tend to follow along ethnic lines. When religious freedom appeared in Bashkortostan after 1988, people returned to the religion
of their ancestors: “Tatars and Bashkirs to Islam, Russians to Orthodoxy, Udmurts and Mari to paganism, Germans to Lutheranism.”121
The Orthodox and Muslim leaders have denounced Protestant
proselytism.122 While some extremist views exist among the Muslim
clergy, “[t]he religious faith of the main body of believers . . . is
however quite different—antidogmatic, open, even eclectic.”123
Many Muslim youth in Bashkortostan feel that their religious leaders
too deferentially support the province’s secular authorities.124 If the
young Islamic reformers in the province had their way, Islamic law
would play a more important role in government decisions. Few
support their ideas, however, and most prefer the secular government to remain secular.
2. The North Caucasus
a. Dagestan. A strongly Islamic province, Dagestan boasts the
greatest number of mosques and Muslim organizations of any province in Russia.125 Comparing the number of Muslim and Christian
organizations in the province shows the extent of the influence of Islam in Dagestan. According to the Committee for Religious Affairs
in Dagestan, “there are 15 Christian religious organisations in
Dagestan.”126 This compares with 1,559 Muslim organizations registered in Dagestan.127 As most places in Russia, Dagestan has experi-

120. Of the nearly four million people who live in Bashkortostan, two million belong to
traditionally Muslim ethnic groups—the Bashkorts and the Tatars. See DAVID C. LEWIS, AFTER
ATHEISM: RELIGION AND ETHNICITY IN RUSSIA AND CENTRAL ASIA 44 (2000).
121. Sergei Filatov, Bashkortostan, supra note 27, at 272.
122. See id. at 274.
123. Id. at 275.
124. See id. at 277.
125. See ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 30–31.
126. Nabi Abdullayev et al., Dagestan’s Silent Catholics, KESTON NEWS SERV., July 12,
1999.
127. See ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 30.
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enced a great religious revival. While most people would have
considered themselves atheists while the Soviet Union still existed,
“[n]ow 90% of people say they’re Muslims.”128
Traditionally, the people of Dagestan follow Sufi Islam, but the
fundamentalist Wahhabi movement is growing in the area.129 Because most people, especially those in control, oppose the Wahhabi
movement in favor of Sufi, a different and less extreme form of Islam, “combined opposition by Sufi sheiks, the mufti and the local
government has stopped the Wahhabi from open worship.”130 While
the government has fought against the Wahhabi movement, its message of renewal and promise of change draws more and more people
to join its numbers.
Recently, extremist Wahhabites from Chechnya tried to create a
popular uprising in Dagestan. Expecting support from the local
Wahhabite population, these insurgents instead found “the overwhelming majority of the . . . Wahhabites distanced themselves from
the fighting.”131 Like many other provinces, Dagestan passed its own
law “On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organisations.”132 In
passing that law, the Dagestani government “intended to restrict
Wahhabite activity.”133 After the attack, the government found the
law “to be too lenient” and decided that “authorities had tolerated
Wahhabism for too long.”134 In some places, government and spiritual leaders have repressed Wahhabite followers by destroying
Wahhabite mosques, driving Wahhabite followers out of villages, or
placing Wahhabite followers under house arrest.135 Other actions include searching the houses of religious leaders and scholars (whose
loyalty is questionable) for extremist literature and destroying television transmitters used for extremists’ broadcasts.136

128. Vanora Bennett, Islamic Fervor Unnerves Russia’s South, BICNEWS, Oct. 27, 1997.
129. See id.
130. Id.
131. Nabi Abdullayev, Crackdown on Dagestan Muslims May be Self-Defeating, KESTON
NEWS SERV., Sept. 1, 1999.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. See id. See also 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 87, at ∗16.
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By strongly repressing the Wahhabite movement, however, the
government is creating a greater problem. “So far the result of such
repression has been to make the indigenous Wahhabites more numerous and more militant.”137 Instead of suppressing the movement,
the government actions actually foster its growth.
b. Chechnya. For the last several years, Russian Federation Forces
have been fighting in Chechnya, trying to bring this republic back
under Russian control. After winning some independence in 1996,
Chechnya experimented with Sharia law based on the Koran.138 Recently, a number of Christian religious leaders were kidnapped; some
were killed.139 Many fear that the Muslim extremists in Chechnya are
specifically targeting Christians.140 “It is not clear if this is connected
with growing Islamic awareness at a time when Chechnya is moving
rapidly to become an Islamic state or whether it is because the overwhelming majority of the Christians that remain in Chechnya are
ethnic Russians.”141 In April of 1999, the leading religious affairs official in Chechnya was kidnapped.142 Though a practicing Muslim,
this official “was instrumental in trying to promote harmony between different faiths and in channeling humanitarian aid into
[Chechnya].”143 His attitude toward other religions and his criticism
of the current regime probably led to his kidnapping.144
Russia’s position towards Chechnya poses a great problem affecting relations between the government and Islamic followers. Historically, Russia has long had poor relations with the Chechen people.145
If the government uses the conflict in Chechnya as an excuse to
abuse and discriminate against all Muslims, Russia may incite other,
now peaceful, Muslim citizens to violence.
c. Stavropol. Even though the province of Stavropol is located in
the region of the Northern Caucuses, it does not have a significant

137. Abdullayev, supra note 131.
138. See Bennett, supra note 128.
139. See Felix Corley & Lawrence Uzzell, Chechen Religious Affairs Official Kidnapped,
KESTON NEWS SERV., May 11, 1999.
140. See 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 95, at ∗13.
141. Corley & Uzzell, supra note 139.
142. See id.
143. Id.
144. See id.
145. See supra Part II.B.
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population of Muslims. Its proximity to Chechnya, though, makes
the government wary of Muslim activities in the province. In fact,
“Stavropol is one of the few provincial capitals in Russia without
regular, public Muslim worship services.”146 A Muslim congregation
registered with the government in 1993, but it has been deprived of
a meeting place ever since.147 The government even denies the Muslims access to the mosque built before the Bolshevik Revolution.148
While tolerating the appearance of other Protestant groups, the government in Stavropol has fought against the Muslim community. On
one occasion, “police broke up a Muslim worship service that was
meeting in a private apartment,” an interference that has not happened to any Christian or Jewish group.149
Attempting to assist the Muslims, the Orthodox Metropolitan of
Stavropol tried to petition the government to return the mosque to
the Muslims. The Orthodox Church enjoys a good relationship with
the Muslims in the area, and Metropolitan Gideon, the Orthodox
Metropolitan of Stavropol, “believes that the Muslims should have a
place of their own in which to worship.”150 A letter written by the
Metropolitan on behalf of the Muslims failed to convince the government to relent.151 The government claimed that it “will never do
anything to stop the Muslims from practising their faith,”152 but it
argued that since “90 percent of the city’s population was Russian, . . . a mosque was not needed.”153
Some blame the government’s behavior on the difficulties in
Chechnya.154 Native Russians are afraid of the growth of what is
called “Wahhabism,” a word that has, unfortunately and for mostly
political reasons, become synonymous with Islamic extremism.155 In

146. Lawrence A. Uzzell & Roman Lunkin, Stavropol Represses Muslims, Tolerates Independent Protestants, KESTON NEWS SERV., Oct. 28, 1999 [hereinafter Stavropol Represses].
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. Whither Human Rights in Russia? Hearing Before the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe, 106th Cong. 29 (1999) (statement of Larry Uzzell, Moscow Representative, Keston Institute).
150. Stavropol Represses, supra note 146.
151. See id.
152. Id. (quoting a deputy of the provincial duma).
153. Id.
154. See id.
155. The Soviets labeled and depicted Islam and Muslim beliefs and practices “as traditional, irrational, reactionary, fanatical, anti-progressive, evil, oppressive, superstitious, anti-
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April 1999, the Stavropol prosecutor deported eight foreign citizens
for preaching what is called “Wahhabism” but what is really Islamic
fundamentalism.156 However, “[t]he head of the FSB (the relabelled
KGB) for the province . . . [suggests] that one way for the secular
authorities to counter the ‘Wahhabi’ extremists was to support those
forms of Islam which were traditional in the region.”157 If the government would support the traditional Muslim community instead of
fighting all forms of Islam, then extremist views would not attract
the Islamic believers who can freely practice their religion.
V. PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED CHANGES TO IMPROVE RELIGIOUS
FREEDOM FOR THE MUSLIM COMMUNITY IN RUSSIA
Muslims have spread throughout Russia. In Moscow, nearly one
in twenty people is Muslim.158 Even though Muslims permeate the
country, Muslims in Russia experience discrimination and persecution from other citizens and even from the government.159 This must
change; Russia must recognize that it is a pluralistic society. Three
main areas of concern need to be addressed to bring about this
change. First, societal attitudes towards Muslims show a lack of acceptance and tolerance that could lead to disruptions like those seen
in the former Yugoslavia if they continue unchanged. Second, government officials who interfere with the operations of Muslim communities increase the likelihood of offending the Muslim population
and driving them to extreme movements that vow to exclude government from religious interference.160 Finally, in their attempt to
modern, the epitome of backwardness, and ultimately the ‘opiate of the people’; therefore
[people] presumed [Muslims] to be the legitimate object of vilification and destruction.” M.
NAZIF SHAHRANI, Islam and the Political Culture of “Scientific Atheism” in Post-Soviet Central
Asia, in THE POLITICS OF RELIGION IN RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF EURASIA 273, 277
(Michael Bourdeaux ed., 1995). While the Soviets determined the Wahhabis to be a problematic militant Islamic movement, the people labeled Wahhabi by the government often turned
out to be neither Wahhabi nor extremists. See MURIEL ATKIN, Islam as Faith, Politics, and
Bogeyman in Tajikistan, in THE POLITICS OF RELIGION IN RUSSIA AND THE NEW STATES OF
EURASIA 247, 252 (Michael Bourdeaux ed., 1995).
156. See 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 95, at ∗7.
157. Stavropol Represses, supra note 146.
158. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 450.
159. See 2000 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 87, at ∗15.
160. The extreme movements are more likely to be those that call for the establishment
of religious, or Sharia, law. By taking positions contrary to the feeling of the Muslim people,
most of whom are not ethnic Russians, the government fails to make the people feel united
and cause the many Muslims to “identify more with outside forces, with the ideology of Islam

795

16PRE-FIN.DOC

7/4/01 11:13 AM

BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[2001

fight terrorism, the Russian government has focused on
Wahhabism—or Islamic extremism—but trying to eradicate terrorism by denying religious freedoms to certain populations negatively
affects the religious freedoms of all Muslims. Finally, the Russian
government must realize that it cannot ignore the needs and concerns of the Islamic community anymore. If these changes are not
made, the application of the 1997 law by local officials, state supported aggression against the Wahhabi, and continuing societal
prejudice could lead to violent religious clashes.
A. The Attitude of Russians Toward Islam
Societal attitudes toward Islam determine government action and
Muslim reactions. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russians have
been trying to identify a new national character. Unfortunately,
many use religion to identify national character. Russia faces the
unique position, however, of close proximity to Muslim nations and
a large Muslim minority.161 These considerations have caused an extreme dichotomy. On the one hand, “Islam is rejected as a distinct
ethnoconfessional system . . . [and] there is a fear of the integrationist potential of Islam, which is capable not only of rallying the Muslim states bordering on Russia, but also of mobilizing Muslims inside
the Russian Federation itself.”162 On the other hand, “Russian nationalism has a desire to stress once more the multi-confessional basis
of Russia . . . [and views] Islam . . . as an objective ally in the struggle against the expansion of the West.”163 These conflicting nationalist sentiments keep prejudice against Islam from growing too strong,
but it is a very precarious balance that could easily shift to the extreme.
1. Prejudicial attitudes against Muslims
Since Moscow is the capital city, the government’s attitude to-

and the countries of the Muslim world.” Fred Weir, Republics in Caucasus Estranged from
Moscow; Frontier Strife May be Tip of Troubled Iceberg, Christian Science Monitor, August 15,
1999, at C11.
161. See Aleksei Malashenko, Russian Nationalism and Islam, in CONFLICTING
LOYALTIES AND THE STATE, supra note 105, at 187, 188 [hereinafter Malashenko, Russian
Nationalism].
162. Id. at 189.
163. Id.
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ward Muslims there should greatly reflect the attitude of the government towards Muslims generally. As a large metropolis, Moscow
draws its population from the far corners of the nation. Nearly one
million Muslims live in Moscow and the surrounding area.164 Since
the time of Catherine the Great, and perhaps as early as the fifteenth
century, Muslims have lived in Moscow.165 Unfortunately, the feelings among Muscovites and most Russians are very critical of Muslims despite their long history of coexistence.166
Recent polls and other studies show that “Russians consistently
rate peoples of the Caucasus as those they dislike the most.”167 Russians call the people from the Caucasus regions “black.”168 In Moscow, “[d]ark skinned residents, whether legal or illegal, whether citizens of the Russian Federation or citizens of other CIS169 countries,
are subjected to multiple identification checks every day.”170 These
Caucasian people come from many different religious backgrounds,
but many are Muslim or come from traditionally Muslim areas.171
Caucasians “are also subject to random searches, illegal seizure of
property, including automobiles, extortion, inordinate fines, detention without charge for up to several weeks, and beatings—
particularly of the kidneys—while in custody.”172 While authorities
treat all Caucasians poorly, some ethnic groups among the
Caucasians receive worse treatment than others.
Among the worst treated of the Caucasians, Chechens are particularly subject to persecution. “Chechens are especially prone to
being round up and often deported under a series of 1993 city and
federal ordinances on ‘regulating the residences of refugees,’ fighting
crime, and implementing the propiska (residence requirement) sys-

164. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 450.
165. See id.
166. See id.
167. Id. at 451. These polls were all taken before the recent fighting in Chechnya began.
168. Id. To be a Caucasian in Russia is to have olive skin and dark hair—not the whiteskinned Europeans people associate with that word in the United States.
169. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, some of the former Soviet Republics formed
a loose alliance called the Commonwealth of Independent States (ICS).
170. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 451. When I was in St. Petersburg in 1995, I noticed, as a
passenger, that the car I was in was much more likely to be stopped by police if the driver was
from the Caucuses than if the driver was a Russian.
171. See supra Part II.C.
172. Arzt, supra note 9, at 452.
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tem.”173 Authorities blamed Chechens for a series of bombings in
1996 even though no suspects had been identified,174 and for the recent bombings in Moscow killing hundreds of people.175 During the
parliamentary rebellion against Boris Yeltsin in 1993, “Moscow authorities stepped up the purge of Chechens and other dark-skinned
peoples.”176 Police have raided mosques claiming to search for weapons and criminals.177 These actions do not endear Muslims to the
Russian authorities, nor does it seem that the government is doing
anything to ensure that the Muslim minority is protected from unfair
treatment by police. If the treatment of Muslims in Moscow is any
indication of an official or unofficial domestic policy and if such
treatment continues, the Muslim population may turn more rebellious and turn to extremists who promise to protect them from the
government’s intolerant behavior.
Some have claimed that “Russia and the United States share a
common perspective on the Islamic world: both have an inordinate
fear of ‘Islamic fundamentalism,’ or more accurately, militant Islamic
revivalism.”178 This fear tends to increase the negative perception of
Islam, and increases the potential for abuse by authorities. Not only
is it possible that the 1997 law will be restrictively applied to Muslims,179 but “Islam has the potential of being linked with political
and ideological resistance, and has been so linked in Russian history,
particularly during periods of intensive Russification campaigns
against cultural minorities.”180
2. The attitude toward Russian Muslims
After seventy years of communist rule, Russians are striving to
rediscover their roots and to develop a new national identity. Under
the Communists, Islam became secularized, and most Muslims main-

173. Id.
174. See id. at 453.
175. See Russians Continue to Lean on Grozny, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Dec. 18, 1999.
176. Arzt, supra note 9, at 453.
177. See id. at 454.
178. Id. at 468.
179. See id. at 472. For example, the local administrator of a city near Moscow has refused for years to allow the construction of a mosque because “‘Islam is not traditional for this
region of Russia.’” Id. (quoting Tatiana Varzanova, Muslims are Opening Mosques, Although
Some Are Obstructed (visited Nov. 1996) <http://www.stetson.edu/~psteeves/relnews>).
180. Id. at 473.
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tained only a superficial belief; “[t]heir knowledge . . . was reduced
to a very few practices.”181 Just as Russians are trying to establish a
new national identity, Muslim minorities are returning to their roots
as well. “Their national consciousness is tied to their religious feeling.”182 Ethnic minorities that were traditionally associated with Islam are turning to religion, some say, because they “see in it an alternative to everything that the Soviet regime represented and stood
for, including the secularism that was a basic Soviet value.”183 Others
point out that ethnic groups “have turned to Islam . . . as the only
overarching identity that could give them the chance to define themselves and to achieve their goals.”184 Some political groups, seizing
an opportunity to turn faith into political returns, use Islam to promote nationalist struggles against the Russian government.185
Though Muslims in Russia generally turn to traditional Islam,
“fundamentalism exists and its ideas and slogans are popular among
a certain section of Russia’s Muslims.”186 Islamic extremists have
earned the government’s ire, but their position should not be a reflection on the entire Muslim community. As one Muslim voice, representative of the view of traditional Muslims, has pointed out,
“[t]he Muslims of Russia want law and order in their country, they
want strong power able to protect them against bandits and terrorists, and foreign invaders; they want a government that would give
them a chance to work and earn, and to ensure freedom of consciousness.”187 Their biggest concern is “that the Russian Federation
should remain a secular state and that none of the religions should
be preferred.”188 By allowing Muslims to continue to develop their
communities and worship freely, the Russian government can guarantee the support of a majority of the Muslim community. If the

181. Yaacov Ro’i, The Secularization of Islam and the USSR’s Muslim Areas, in MUSLIM
EURASIA, supra note 45, at 5, 15.
182. Alexei Malashenko, Does Islamic Fundamentalism Exist in Russia?, in MUSLIM
EURASIA, supra note 45, at 41, 42 [hereinafter Malashenko, Islamic Fundamentalism].
183. Ro’i, supra note 181, at 15.
184. Paul Goble, Russia: Analysis from Washington—Nationalism and Islam, Islam and
Nationalism, Radio Free Europe (Aug. 11, 1999) (visited Jan. 18, 2001) <http://
www.rferl.org>.
185. See Malashenko, Russian Nationalism, supra note 160, at 46; Zverev, supra note
106, at 134–135.
186. Malashenko, Islamic Fundamentalism, supra note 182, at 43.
187. Murtazin, supra note 8, at ∗11.
188. Id. at ∗8.
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Russians would avoid singling out Muslims as the source of their
problems and focus on the real issue—terrorism and the terrorists
who perform it—the Muslim community would feel less persecuted.
Unfortunately, the government has not yet employed this method of
cementing a positive relationship with the Muslims.
B. Political Interference in Islamic Affairs Must Stop
Religious groups in Russia have long been manipulated by the
state, especially under the Communists. “[T]he Communists developed a theory of treating religion as a ‘necessary evil’ in order to
have it as a tool for implementing the Communist ideology.”189 Now
that religious freedom is guaranteed by the Constitution, the separation of church and state should be inviolate. However, as the 1997
law shows, the government is unwilling to give up all control over
religious beliefs. In addition, there is an unfortunate trend to “increas[e] the politicization of religion,” and manipulate religious organizations to obtain political power.190 To curb this disturbing
trend, Russia should look to the European Court of Human Rights,
since “[it] is the international tribunal with the most developed case
law in the area of freedom of conscience.”191 Since Russia ratified the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms in May of 1998, it has exhibited a willingness to submit to the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human
Rights.192
An example of government interference with religious organizations occurred recently in Tatarstan when President Shaimiyev manipulated the election so that his candidate would be chosen as mufti
of the Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Tatarstan. Because of his actions against the government, the head mufti in Tatarstan, Gabdulla
Galliulin, incurred the anger of President Shaimiyev, who managed
to have him replaced as head mufti by a handpicked supporter. In
February 1998, the Muslim Spiritual Directorate of Tatarstan held a
189. Basova, supra note 59, at 185–86.
190. Andrei Oskarovich Protopopov, Church-State Relations in the Russian Federation,
1996 BYU L. REV. 853, 866.
191. Joseph Brossart, Legitimate Regulation of Religion? European Court of Human
Rights Religious Freedom Doctrine and the Russian Federation Law “On Freedom of Conscience
and Religious Organizations”, 22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. Rev. 297, 301 (1999).
192. See European Court of Human Rights, Dates of Ratifications (last modified March
19, 2001) <http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Edocs/DatesOfRatifications.html>.

800

16PRE-FIN.DOC

773]

7/4/01 11:13 AM

Islam in Russia

convention where delegates would decide whether to reelect Galliulin as the head mufti of the Directorate.193 Though delegates were
to be picked by their fellow believers, local government authorities
actually appointed most of them.194 Unlike previous conventions,
this one had a strong police presence, including the presence of
high-ranking government officials, and was even opened with a
speech by President Shaimiyev.195 While President Shaimiyev “did
not publicly support any candidate; ‘he followed a subtle policy.’”196
All the delegates knew that the President wanted Gusman Isakhov to
be elected head mufti. Unsurprisingly, Isakhov won the election, and
immediately the government loaned 500,000 new rubles, the equivalent of $82,000, to the Muslims.197 In return, Isakhov promised to
support President Shaimiyev in the next elections. The Tatarstan
president successfully installed a puppet leader in Tatarstan’s Muslim
Spiritual Directorate, compromising the integrity of that organization and possibly threatening the stability of the religious environment in the province. One observer called this action “probably the
greatest violation of religious freedom in [1998] in Russia.”198 Despite the fact that Muslim and Orthodox peacefully coexisted in
Tatarstan, the actions of the secular government may tear that peace
apart.
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has dealt with
this situation in two different cases and determined that such actions
violate the freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.199 The Case

193. See Lawrence A. Uzzell, Tatarstan Government Dictates Muslims’ Choice of Spiritual
Leader, KESTON NEWS SERV., May 26, 1998.
194. See id.
195. See id.
196. Id. (quoting a member of the Tatarstan government’s Council for Religious Affairs).
197. See id.
198. Whither Human Rights in Russia?, supra note 148, at 37.
199. Both cases involved alleged violations of Article 9 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, opened for signature Nov. 4,
1950, art. 9, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter European Convention], which states:
Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; this
right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or
in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief,
in worship, teaching, practice and observance.
Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
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of Serif v. Greece involved the appeal of a Muslim religious leader
from a decision by a Greek court finding him guilty of usurping the
functions of a minister.200 A few months after the President of Greece
confirmed one man as the Mufti of Rodopi, two Members of Parliament “requested the State to organise elections for the post of Mufti
of Rodopi.”201 Despite the appointment, the Members of Parliament
wanted the opportunity to elect their own mufti. Though the government did not reply to this request, elections were nevertheless
held and Serif was elected Mufti of Rodopi.202 This election conflicted with the President’s appointment and could not be considered
legal because the government did not give the approval to hold the
election. After acting in this capacity for a few months, the public
prosecutor “instituted criminal proceedings against [Serif] . . . for
having usurped the functions of a minister . . . and for having publicly worn the uniform of such a minister without having the right to
do so.”203 When the courts in Greece found Serif guilty of the
charges, he appealed to the ECHR.
The court first noted that “while religious freedom is primarily a
matter of individual conscience, it also includes, inter alia, freedom,
in community with others and in public, to manifest one’s religion in
worship and teaching.”204 Although the court agreed that the government had a legitimate purpose in trying to “preserve order,”205 it
held that “[t]he role of the authorities [when a religious community
becomes divided] is not to remove the cause of tension by eliminating pluralism, but to ensure that the competing groups tolerate each
other.”206 The court decided that religious pluralism in modern times
should tolerate a rift between religious factions; the State cannot interfere with leadership decisions because the members of religious
groups have the right to choose who should lead them.207
In the Case of Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria, the ECHR had to

200.
201.
ment.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
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decide a similar issue.208 The applicants, Hasan and Chaush, claimed
that the Bulgarian government forced their replacement as leaders in
the Muslim religious community.209 Hasan had been elected Chief
Mufti of Bulgarian Muslims in 1992, and the Directorate of Religious Denominations registered him as such.210 A few years later, a
national conference, organized by people outside of Hasan’s Muslim
religious organization, was held and an alternative leadership was
elected.211 After this conference, “the newly elected leaders applied
to the Directorate of Religious Denominations for registration as the
legitimate leadership of Muslims in Bulgaria.”212 The government let
the new leadership take over, apparently believing “that the Muslim
religion in Bulgaria could have only one leadership” contrary to prior
practices with other religions.213
When Mr. Hasan appealed to the ECHR, it held that “the believer’s right to freedom of religion encompasses the expectation that
the community will be allowed to function peacefully free from arbitrary State intervention.”214 Finally, the court held “that the interference with the internal organisation of the Muslim community and
the applicants’ freedom of religion was not ‘prescribed by law’ in
that it was arbitrary and was based on legal provisions which allowed
an unfettered discretion to the executive and did not meet the
required standards of clarity and foreseeability.”215 The court held
that the arbitrary government interference with an internal religious
organization violated Article 9216 of the European Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, which
protects religious freedom.217 If the situation that occurred in
Tatarstan were brought before the ECHR, it is likely that the court
would find a violation of religious freedom.
As Russia is asserting its new identity and guaranteeing new
rights to religious freedom and conscience, it can little afford to

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

See Hasan v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. (App. no. 30985/96) (2000).
See id. ¶ 3.
See id. ¶ 13.
See id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 16.
Id. ¶ 28.
Id. ¶ 62.
Id. ¶ 86.
See European Convention, supra note 199, art. 9.
See id. ¶ 89.
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jeopardize the transition process. The people need to feel that they
can legitimately rely on the State to protect their new-found religious liberty. If government leaders interfere in the process of picking the religious leaders, the people will recognize that their freedoms are guaranteed on paper only. As a minority religion in a
country that gives special status to the Russian Orthodox Church,
any interference by the government is likely to be seen as an attempt
to limit the religious beliefs of the Muslim community. By alienating
the Muslim community in this way, even local government officials
can incite rebellion that takes on a political, rather than a religious,
character.
C. By Focusing Its Anger on “Islamic Extremists,” Russia Harms all
Islam
In recent years, Russia has been plagued with terrorist activities,
from the war in Chechnya to bombings in Moscow, most of which
are blamed on Islamic extremists. Thousands are dead because of
these terrorists. Authorities have associated these activities with
Wahhabism. Many have noted that “the media is busy presenting
Wahhabism as the main enemy of Russia.”218 Because people know
that Wahhabism is associated with Islam, the rhetoric against
Wahhabism affects the public perception of Islam as a whole.
However, because Wahhabism is not necessarily synonymous with
Islamic extremism, intimately associating the two harms all Islam.
While the Russian government and Muslim communities wish to
fight against Wahhabism, different approaches have been suggested
to combat the movement. The government pursues an approach
intended to crush the Wahhabites, while members of the Muslim
community prefer to defend it by converting Muslims to traditional
Islam and away from extremism. The violent method utilized by the
government has not worked and probably encourages more people
to support the Wahhabites.
Government authorities “have been careful to distinguish between their current adversaries [the Wahhabites] and Muslims in
general.”219 By separating Wahhabism from the rest of Islam, the authorities stress that they are not anti-Islam, only anti-extremism.
However, by turning Wahhabism and Islamic extremism into a “po218. Murtazin, supra note 8, at ∗11.
219. Chaos in the Caucasus, ECONOMIST, Oct. 9, 1999, at 23.
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litical threat to the institutional expression of the state,” Russian authorities have negatively affected society’s perception of Islam as a
whole.220
Though the government officially does not blame the entire
Muslim community for the problems in Chechnya and for terrorist
bombings, the Russian people find it difficult to disassociate
Wahhabites from Muslims. When the government blamed a series of
bomb attacks in Russian cities on Chechen terrorists, its “allegations
simply confirmed the anti-Chechen, and generally anti-Caucasian,
prejudice they already harboured.”221 These kinds of allegations result in negative attitudes toward all people who “might be from the
Caucuses and to Muslims in general.”222 Some claim that the Russian
authorities even used prejudicial attitudes against Muslims to gain
support for the war in Chechnya, which leads to the perception that
Islam is synonymous with terrorism.223 In a recent survey of young
Russians, eighty percent of the respondents “said that Islam was a
‘bad thing.’”224 Muslims have been denied permission to open
mosques and cemeteries in the Volga Region because local townspeople have negative opinions about Muslims and Orthodox clergy
fear “the ‘excessive zeal’ of Islam.”225 When Russian newspapers
print interviews where extremists boast that “[they] will enter Moscow with swords in our hands” and say “[i]t will become a Muslim
city,” it is reasonable for many people to become nervous.226 These
kind of statements must be condemned as words of a terrorist.
Instead of merely combating terrorism, Russian authorities are
increasing fears and prejudices against Muslims by maintaining a
negative campaign against Wahhabism.
Some state institutions in Russia have called for the government
to ban Wahhabism, a suggestion that has caused concern among
220. Flemming Splidsboel-Hansen, The Official Russian Concept of Contemporary Central Asian Islam: The Security Dimension, 49 EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES 1501, 1506 (1997).
221. Chaos in the Caucasus, supra note 219, at 24.
222. Caryl, supra note 107, at 21.
223. See Prepared Testimony of [sic] Presented by Firuz Kazamezadeh Commissioner U.S.
Commission on International Religious Freedom Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
FEDERAL NEWS SERV., May 16, 2000.
224. Caryl, supra note 107, at 21–22.
225. Malashenko, Russian Nationalism, supra note 161, at 192.
226. Yelena Suponina, “Moscow Will Become a Muslim City”, MOSCOW NEWS, Nov. 17,
1999.
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Russia’s Muslim leaders.227 These leaders point out that before any
type of ban becomes effective, however, the government must clearly
define what Wahhabism is.228 This may not be easy and will probably
infringe on the right to freedom of conscience that is guaranteed by
the Russian Constitution. Despite the possibility of abuses, Russia’s
Security Council reportedly “recommended that national legislation
on the freedom of conscience and religious organisations be
amended to outlaw Wahhabism.”229 While nothing yet has been
done about this, it would be a horrible mistake for the government
to ban Wahhabism.
Muslim leaders would much rather have the government focus
its efforts against terrorism and not against religion. Islamic leaders
have stressed that “Islam calls for peace, mutual tolerance and respect.”230 One proposal suggests that “[t]errorists and bandits should
be destroyed while Wahhabism as an ideology should be opposed
with another ideology which the Muslims of Russia will be ready to
embrace.”231 This idea recognizes that Wahhabism can be counteracted by religious teachings that encourage peace and mutual respect
rather than violence. It suggests that, as a religion, Wahhabism can
be counteracted by preaching and living true Islam, while the government should fight terrorism punishing the crime, not the belief.
Terrorism should not be blamed on religion because it blights the
entire religion instead of focusing on the acts of the individual. As
another has suggested, the “well-being in the country can be
achieved only through lasting peace and accord between all people of
various faiths.”232 By punishing the entire religious movement for the
acts of individual terrorists, the authorities legitimize violence and
prejudice against all members of a particular religion. In this case,
publicizing terrorist acts as the fruit of Muslim believers creates the
assumption that all Muslims are bad and should be feared. By pun227. See Dmitry Zlodoryov, Council of Russia’s Muftis to Discuss Ban on Wahhabism,
ITAR-TASS NEWS AGENCY, June 27, 2000.
228. See Dmitry Zlodorev, Russia, CIS Moslem Leaders to Discuss Social Problems, ITARTASS NEWS AGENCY, June 28, 2000.
229. Vladimir Radyuhin, Russia Plans Ban on Fundamentalist Group, HINDU, Aug. 6,
2000.
230. Yelena Dorofeyeva, Moslem Leaders Say Dagestan Rebels by No Means Islamists,
ITAR-TASS NEWS AGENCY, Sept. 9, 1999.
231. Murtazin, supra note 8, at ∗10.
232. This idea comes from chief mufti Ravil Gainutdin. Peace Between Believers Key to
Russia’s Prosperity, ITAR-TASS NEWS AGENCY, Jan. 8, 2000.
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ishing the terrorists and combating the religious movement through
religious teaching, Islamic leaders can improve the lives of Muslims
and establish better, positive, and effective relationships with Russian
authorities.
Russia needs to combat religious extremism, not with violence
and interference, but by allowing the religious community to police
itself. While terrorists should be punished, Wahhabism, as a religious
movement, can only be effectively challenged by religious teachings,
not by government repression. Marat Murtazin, Rector of the Moscow Islamic University put it well when he wrote, “[w]e do hope
that in Russia today we shall find enough wisdom and will-power in
our souls not to turn the great country into a testing ground of a
dubious theory and an arena of armed clashes in which our state and
whole nations will perish.”233
D. Ignoring the Muslim Community Will Only Incite Religious
Conflicts
While Russian society’s “attitude to Muslim fundamentalism is
generally critical or negative, [its attitude] to Islam [is] indifferent.”234 Though only a minority of Russian citizens are Muslim, it is
a significant minority. Because of its close proximity to many Islamic
countries and shared borders with others, Russia can little afford to
offend its neighbors by treating Islam with prejudice, let alone indifference.235 Trying to develop contemporary ideas of freedom of religion and conscience can be difficult especially when there are supporters from many different religious confessions trying to get the
government’s attention. While the West wants the Russian government to address the mistreatment of minority Christian religions,
Russia needs to also focus on the needs of the Islamic community.
By ignoring or stigmatizing the Muslim population, Russia could be
creating the catalyst for organized religious opposition.
233. Murtazin, supra note 8, at ∗11–12.
234. Malashenko, Islamic Fundamentalism, supra note 182, at 41. In a 1994 Moscow
poll, seventeen percent of the respondents had a negative attitude toward Islam, while approximately forty-five percent viewed Islam with indifference. See Malashenko, Russian Nationalism, supra note 161, at 191.
235. As one commentator put it, “Russia will continue to directly encounter conflict
situations involving her Muslim neighbours and will have to take part indirectly in their resolution.” Malashenko, Russian Nationalism, supra note 161, at 201.
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Under the Soviets, the government developed a policy of divide
and rule. This policy, attributed to Stalin, emphasized limiting political power of minorities by preventing minorities from “being exclusively concentrated within the borders of its ‘national homeland,’
and . . . [] forming a solid majority within it.”236 By dividing ethnic
groups between “different autonomous units” and assuring that a
number of loyal groups, such as ethnic Russians, lived in these units,
the government could undermine or neutralize the voice of contentious minorities.237 A consequence of this policy is that the Muslim
community is still very divided along ethnic lines and among different political units within Russia.238
Because the Muslim community in Russia is so divided, many
feel it is unlikely that a united front could be developed to challenge
the current system. For example, there are “about seventy aboriginal
ethnic groups . . . found in the Caucasus, speaking languages
belonging to three different linguistic families.”239 There are about
twenty significant ethnic groups that follow an Islamic tradition.240
Although the Muslim community is more concentrated in the North
Caucasus, Tatarstan, and Bashkortostan, there are Muslims
throughout the country. This division along ethnic, linguistic, and
geographic lines significantly increases the difficulties of fomenting a
unified Islamic movement. Because unity is thought to be unlikely, it
is easy to focus on the small conflicts that occur rather than
addressing the overarching concerns of which the small conflicts are
a symptom. However, the possibility that the Muslim community
could become united against the state is not so inconceivable. By
ignoring the big problems, the largest of which is societal prejudice
against ethnic Muslims, the Russian authorities show their
indifference to the interests of the Muslim community.
While the Muslim community is fragmented along many fronts,
there are also several common threads that unify it. Some suggest
that their “common struggle against Russian and Soviet rule” and
“shared suffering at the hands of both the Russian imperial and the
Soviet authorities” unite the Muslim community.241 However, “Rus236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
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sian diplomacy has been quite adept at manipulating the geopolitical
divisions within the Muslim world.”242 The policy of divide and rule
provided methods for the government to limit the intensity of these
unifying characteristics by rewarding loyalty, thereby pacifying some
Muslim peoples. Despite this effect, continued government crackdowns on Muslim communities, justified as attempts to eliminate extremist groups, may be the catalyst that unifies the Muslims. “[I]f
some sort of common Muslim front ever emerges in Russia, resentment of Moscow will be the only factor that holds it together.”243
Because Russian authorities can influence how Muslims are treated in
Russia, they have the power to determine whether the Muslim community develops this common feeling of resentment.
Russia needs to realize the importance of seriously addressing the
needs of the Muslim community. The policies of the past, such as divide and rule, will not work in a democratic and pluralistic society.
Authorities cannot treat Russia as an Orthodox state “with the
Muslims surviving as a tolerated minority.”244 Trying to establish
government along that pattern will only unite the Muslims in their
dissatisfaction with the state. Most Russians share the same desires:
to be able to work, believe, and live in an open society – the things
denied them under the Communist regime. By seeking true
solutions that will assure that Muslims and Orthodox Russians can
live together peacefully, the government will enable the uniting of
the Muslim community with them, rather than against them.
Historically, “both Russian people and institutions . . . gravitate
toward political autocracy, ethnic intolerance, and a single established religion or predominant ideology.”245 Russia cannot afford to
be guided by its own history. It needs to break with the past and
overcome prejudicial attitudes, intolerance of religious minorities,
and state interference in religious affairs. If Russia will take these
steps, it can reach its potential as a pluralistic nation that allows its
large Muslim minority to associate peacefully with the Russian Orthodox majority.
What does the future hold for Islam in Russia? Muslims have
lived in Russia for a thousand years. They will live there for a thou-

242.
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244.
245.

Chaos in the Caucasus, supra note 219, at 26.
Id.
Murtazin, supra note 8, at ∗4.
Lekhel, supra note 59, at 231.
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sand more. Whether they remain at peace with the ruling authority
depends on what actions the government will take. In most of Russia, Muslims face few official obstacles restricting their ability to
openly practice their religion. The U.S. State Department summed
up the current situation by observing that “[a]lthough Jews and
Muslims continue to encounter prejudice and societal discrimination . . . they generally have not been inhibited by the authorities in
the free practice of their religion.”246 If the government does nothing
to discourage prejudice and societal discrimination, then relations
will begin to sour and extremist views will find supporters among the
Muslim population. If genuine religious freedom can be fostered in
the provinces of Russia, then most of Russia’s religious problems will
sort themselves out.247 Though persecution and discrimination currently exist, Russia can take steps to avoid religious conflict with its
Muslim community by addressing the issues discussed in this paper:
developing a more tolerant attitude in the government toward Muslims, refusing to interfere in internal religious affairs, and focusing its
efforts on eradicating terrorism, not Wahhabism.
Russia is now “a pluralistic society in which the most disparate
elements will have to learn to live together.”248 Most of the political
leaders of the country recognize the need for peaceful relations between Russia and its large Muslim population. Even Aleksandr Lebed, a strong nationalist, when mentioning the traditional religions
of Russia, listed Islam with Orthodoxy and Buddhism.249 Russia borders very close to a number of Middle Eastern countries and has
strong economic ties with Islamic nations. “Russia shares a more significant strategic interest with Turkey, Iran, Tajikistan, and other
Central Asian and Middle Eastern states than it does with the
West.”250 For these reasons, the Russian government can little afford
to offend the Muslim community.
Some people claim that Russian action in Chechnya and the repression of Islamic extremism may incite religious conflict.251 Others
246. 1999 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 95, at ∗8.
247. See COMM’N ON SEC. & COOPERATION IN EUR., RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN RUSSIA,
BRIEFING OF THE COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE 9 (1997)
(statement of Lawrence Uzzell, Moscow Representative of the Keston Institute).
248. Bourdeaux, supra note 36, at 159.
249. See id.
250. Arzt, supra note 9, at 468.
251. See Chaos in the Caucasus, supra note 219, at 26. One newspaper article stated,
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point out that Muslims may become more persecuted because they
have no one “to speak up for them in the West.”252 Others can see
Russia becoming a greater enemy in the eyes of the Islamic world
than the United States because of government attempts to repress
Muslim extremism.253 While this may be a possibility, at least the
rhetoric of political leaders has not yet affected the relationship between religious leaders. As mentioned previously, in several situations
in Tatarstan, the Muslim and Orthodox clergy have supported each
other in their common goals to rebuild and reestablish their religious
communities. If the Russian government will support traditional
Muslim faiths and allow these Muslims the full freedoms they are
guaranteed by the 1993 Constitution without interference, it will be
able to contain the growth of Wahhabi extremism. However, if the
government restricts all Muslim faith in that part of the country in
order to combat the growth of extremism, their attempt will backfire.
VI. CONCLUSION
Under the 1997 law “On Freedom of Conscience and on
Religious Associations,” Islam has experienced relatively few
problems registering with the government. Instead, the biggest
challenge has come from political partisanship and societal attitudes.
While the Muslim population, for the most part, continues to
support the Russian government, government actions could lead to
the growth of Islamic extremism if they are perceived to be antiMuslim. If Russia wants to avoid religious conflicts with its Muslim
population, the government needs to support the growth of
traditional Muslim faiths and encourage religious toleration. Russia
has only experienced religious freedom for ten years, after seventy
years of repression of all religions. As the country continues to
develop, Islam will continue to play an important role in Russian
politics and culture. Because tolerance is not just a word, but an
action, Russia holds its destiny in its own hands.

“Muslim anger has been inflamed by contact with Caucasian Muslims, driven from their rugged mountains.” Michael Jansen, Chechen War Angers Muslims, IRISH TIMES, Jan. 4, 2000, at
12.
252. Whither Human Rights in Russia?, supra note 149, at 29.
253. See Arzt, supra note 9, at 467–68.
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Appendix

TABLE 1: NUMBER AND LOCATION OF MOSQUES THROUGHOUT
RUSSIA BY REGION AND CITY254
REGIONS
Northern Caucuses
Tatarstan
Bashkortostan
CITIES
Makhachkala (Dagestan)
Kazan (Bashkortostan)
Moscow
Astrakhan
Orenburg
Norilsk
Vologda
Yaroslavl
Krasnoyarsk

NUMBER OF MOSQUES
More than 5000
More than 850
More than 400
36
30
5
5
4
1
1
1
1

254. ASADULLIN, supra note 10, at 15.
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TABLE 2: THE EXTENT OF MUSLIM INFLUENCE IN RUSSIA SHOWN
255
BY THE GEOGRAPHICAL MEMBERSHIP OF DUMER
Member associations of the DUMER include:
Location
Number of
Registered
Moscow
20256
Moskovskii Oblast
16
Krasnodar
5
Nizhni Novgorod
3
Kostroma
1
Kaliningrad
1
Yaroslavl
2
Smolensk
1
Tula
1
Orel
1
Mordovia
3
Kursk
1
Ivanovo
1
Vologda
1
Vladimir
3
Rostov
5
St. Petersburg
1
Samara
1
Tambov
1
Tver
2
Penza
2
Chuvashia
2

255. See id. at 73–80.
256. Id. at 33.
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Number of
Congregations
20

Number of
Mosques
5

48

48

1

Mosques Under
Construction

1

1
1

40

1

1

1
50

1
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TABLE 3: MUSLIMS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION257
Muslim Ethnic Group
Tatars
Bashkirs
Chechens
Kazakhs
Avars
Kabardinins (Circassians)
Dargins
Azerbaijanis
Kumyks
Ingushes
Karachays
Digor Ossetians∗
Uzbeks
Adygeys (Circassians)
Laks
Total ∗∗

Population
5,543,000
1,345,000
899,000
636,000
544,000
386,000
353,000
277,000
257,000
215,000
150,000
130,000
127,000
125,000
106,000
11,699,000

∗Estimate

of 130,000 based on population of 402,000 for all Ossetians, most of whom are Eastern Orthodox.
∗∗Additional Muslim ethnic groups with populations, each under
100,000, are Nogay Tatars, Tabassarans, Aguly, Rutuls, and
Tsakhurs—all in Dagestan.

257. This table is taken directly out of Arzt, supra note 9, at 475 (based on information
from the 1989 USSR All-Union Census).
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